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The teacher quality literature has generally ignored teacher spillover effects in 
secondary school with little empirical or theoretical justification.  This study uses 
administrative data linking students and teachers at the classroom level to show 
that  educational  output  in  secondary  school  is  jointly  produced  by  multiple 
teacher inputs.  Specifically, math production is jointly determined by math and 
social studies teachers and reading production by math and English teachers.  In 
each tested subject, distributional shifts in teacher quality for both same-subject 
and  off-subject  teachers  have  economically  meaningful  effects  on  student 
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Unlike elementary-school students, secondary-school students are taught by multiple teachers 
each  year.    However,  the  educational-production  literature  has  traditionally  assigned  student 
performance in each subject in secondary school to a specific teacher.  For example, students’ 
math outcomes have been attributed to the effects of math teachers and reading outcomes to the 
effects of English teachers.  The assumption that only same-subject teachers influence student 
performance lacks empirical support.  This paper aims to quantify the degree to which teacher 
effects in one subject spill over into other subjects.  The results show that educational output in 
secondary school is jointly produced by multiple teachers. 
 
I measure teacher effects by value-added to student test scores in math and reading.  In each 
tested subject, I consider the effects of four different teacher types: math, English, science and 
social  studies.   For math and English  teachers,  I estimate both  same-subject  and off-subject 
(spillover) teacher effects.  Science and social studies teachers are evaluated entirely in terms of 
spillover effects.  The primary contribution of the paper is that it explicitly models the joint-
production environment in secondary school.
1  I find that math production is jointly determined 
by math and social studies teachers and reading production by math and Eng lish teachers.  In 
each tested subject, distributional shifts in teacher quality for both same-subject and off-subject 
teachers have large effects on student performance. 
 
By finding consistent and robust evidence for joint production in secondary education, this paper 
contributes to a growing literature on joint production more generally.  Importantly, insights 
                                                 
1 Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007) is the only other study that evaluates outcome-based teacher quality in 
secondary school.  Although these authors acknowledge the possibility of joint production among secondary-school 
teachers, they do not pursue this issue in detail in their analysis.   2 
from this literature are relevant to the education setting.  For example, Mas and Moretti (2007) 
evaluate  joint  production  among  supermarket  cashiers  and  find  large  peer  effects  among 
workers.  These peer effects depend on the ease with which workers can observe each others’ 
productivities.  The presence of teacher spillover effects implies that teacher performance will be 
visible to larger teacher peer groups.  School administrators may be able to exploit peer effects 
among secondary-school teachers to improve productivity.   
 
Because teacher effects spill over across subjects in secondary school, analyses based on the 
single-teacher-effect hypothesis understate the importance of teacher quality as an educational 
resource.    The  magnitudes  of  the  teacher  spillover  effects  estimated  here  imply  that  this 
understatement is significant.  Although it is not necessarily clear what the objective function of 
a school district is or should be, one reasonable objective function would be to maximize student 
achievement.  Given such an objective function and numerous inputs to production, if a school 
district  did  not  acknowledge  teacher  spillover  effects  it  would  under-allocate  expenditures 
toward the recruitment (and possibly the development) of high-quality teachers. 
 
Teacher  spillover  effects  are  also  relevant  in  the  context  of  performance-based  teacher 
compensation.  To properly design an accountability scheme, a school district would need to 
know  the  specifics  of  the  production  process  as  it  relates  to  teachers.    For  example,  which 
teachers should it hold accountable for student performance in which subjects?  What are the 
relative magnitudes of the different teacher effects?  Does teacher quality across subjects interact 
in the production process, implying the presence of team teaching?   
   3 
This analysis sheds light on each of these questions.  I identify which teacher types affect student 
performance in which subjects and provide quantitative estimates of the effects of distributional 
shifts in teacher quality by subject and teacher-type.  I also consider the extent to which teacher 
effects interact in the production function.  The interaction results are mixed but provide little 
evidence that student achievement in secondary school is team-produced.  Teacher effects do 
interact in reading production, but not in math production.  Furthermore, the interaction effects in 
reading production at least partly reflect diminishing returns to teacher quality across subjects 
rather than team-teaching effects. 
 
I.  The Educational Production Function 
 
The first step in evaluating joint production among teachers in secondary school is to develop a 
methodology for estimating teacher effects.  Student achievement in any given year is the result 
of a cumulative set of inputs from families, peers, communities and schools.  Because data on the 
complete  histories  of  students  are  unavailable,  researchers  have  focused  on  estimating 
educational production in terms of value-added.  The general value-added framework explains 
current performance as a function of current inputs while controlling for past performance: 
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Here, Yisjt is a test score for student i at school s with teacher-set j in year t, ʱi represents 
observed and unobserved time-invariant student characteristics, Xit is a vector of time-varying 
observable student characteristics, δs represents observed and unobserved time-invariant school 
characteristics, Sit is a vector of observed time-varying school characteristics, Cit is a vector of   4 
time-varying observable classroom characteristics and θkj measures the quality of teacher k (who 
is  part of teacher-set  j).  A specific form  of this  general  value-added  model, the gain-score 
model, is also commonly employed in empirical work. 
 
I evaluate teacher effects on math and reading test scores for four teacher types: math, English, 
science and social studies.
2  Index math teachers from j = 1,…,J; English teachers from p = 
1,…,P; science teachers from q = 1,…,Q; and social studies teachers from r = 1,…,R.  For 
student i who has the jth math teacher, the pth English teacher, the qth science teacher and the rth 
social  studies  teacher;  the  set  of  teacher  effects  influencing  her  performance  is  defined  as 
( j  , p  , q  , r  )  where  j    indicates  the  quality  of  math  teacher  j,  p  indicates  the  quality  of 
English teacher p, and so on.  I estimate the effects of these four teacher types on student test-
score performance using the following within-school-and-student value-added specification: 
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In (1), teachers are indexed by subject as indicated above and denoted by superscripts.  All of the 
explanatory variables are defined above and a detailed list of the sets of controls in each vector is 
in Table 1.  Vectors of indicator variables for schools and teachers are denoted by a “D” and are 
appropriately labeled.  This specification allows for joint production among teachers by allowing 
                                                 
2 These four teacher types are the most common in San Diego high schools and arguably most relevant for 
evaluating cognitive performance.  Among the remaining teacher types that are omitted from this analysis, some of 
the more common teachers include language teachers and art teachers.  The class-taking behavior of my student 
sample is detailed in Section III.     5 
multiple  teachers  to  affect  student  outcomes.  However,  it  does  not  allow  for  interactions 
between teachers, which will be incorporated later. 
  
To control for the variety of different types of classes that students take in high school, the vector 
of classroom controls (Cit) includes indicator variables for the subjects and levels of subjects that 
students take each year (e.g., algebra or geometry, regular or honors English, etc.).  This prevents 
variation in subject material from being attributed to variation in teacher quality and means that 
teacher quality is measured within subject and subject level.  To address the issue of student peer 
effects, the model includes controls for the year (t-1) achievement of classroom-level peers for 
each student’s math and English classrooms.
3  Finally, I control for class size to prevent variation 
in class size from being misinterpreted as variation in teacher quality.
4  
 
In addition to controlling for unobserved differences in school quality, the within -school-and-
student  specification  in (1)  also minimizes omitted variables bias generated by unobserved  
heterogeneity  in  student  ability   across  teachers.    For  example,  if  the  m ost  able  students 
consistently  sort  themselves  into  the  best  teachers’  classrooms  (perhaps  through  parental 
lobbying), the estimated teacher effects will be unbiased by the differences in student ability 
across teachers created by this sorting.  This is because the within-student aspect of the model 
ensures that teachers are evaluated relative to other teachers who teach the same students.   
 
                                                 
3 I also run models that include peer and class-size effects for social studies and science classrooms, although these 
models are complicated by the fact that not all students take science and social studies classes in each year.  
Regardless, the inclusion of these additional controls has a negligible effect on results. 
4 Controls are included for math and English class sizes only.  Class-size controls have a negligible effect on teacher 
quality estimates.   6 
The tradeoff of the within-school-and-student approach is that it ignores any between-school and 
between-student variation in teacher quality.  To the extent that teachers vary in quality across 
schools or across tracks of students within schools, the within-school-and-student estimates will 
understate the total variance of teacher quality in secondary school.  Appendix C evaluates the 
sensitivity of my results to alternative specifications that allow for teacher quality to vary across 
schools  and  across  students  within  schools.    The  appendix  provides  little  evidence  that  the 
within-school, across-student variance component is large.
5  However, across-school variation in 
teacher quality may be of a non-negligible magnitude.
6  Therefore, estimates from equation (1) 
may understate the variance of teacher quality in secondary school through their omission of this 
across-school variance.  I present my results here as unbiased estimates of within -school-and-
student teacher effects.   
 
I adopt the method of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) to estimate the model in (1).  This method 
involves first differencing to remove the student fixed effects and then, to account for correlation 
between the first-differenced lagged dependent variable and the first -differenced error term, 
estimating  the  model  using  2SLS,  instrumenting  for  ( 1) ( 2) ()
jpqr jpqr
is t is t TestScore TestScore     with 
( 2) ()
jpqr
is t TestScore  .  The first-differenced version of equation (1) is detailed below: 
 
                                                 
5 This finding is also supported by evidence showing that there is little within-school student tracking in the data.  
See below. 
6 Measuring across-school variation in teacher quality is complicated by other environmental differences across 
schools.  In the absence of a controlled experiment, it is impossible to disentangle across-school differences in 
teacher quality from differences in other factors across schools that might influence student performance.   7 
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The second term in parentheses on the right hand side is the fitted value for the test score change 
from the first stage of the 2SLS procedure.
7  The instrumentation is necessary because there is a 
mechanical relationship between the first-differenced lagged test score and the first-differenced 
error term.  Namely,  the period (t-1) test score is a direct function of the period (t-1) epsilon.  
The  key assumption required for the   instrumentation to be valid is that the error terms in 
equation (1) are serially uncorrelated (such that the period (t-2) test score is uncorrelated with the 
first-differenced error term).  Although this assumption is not directly verifiable using equation 
(1), I use the first-differenced error terms within students to test for serial correlation between the 
epsilons and find that this primary assumption is upheld.
8,9    
 
 
II.  Identification of Teacher Effects 
 
The  identification  of  teacher  effects  is  complicated  by  potential  non-random  student-teacher 
assignment.  As discussed in the previous section, to address the more general concern that 
                                                 
7 The period (t-2) test-score level is a powerful instrument: t-statistics on the period (t-2) test-score are greater than 
50 for each of the first-stage models. 
8 The white noise assumption for the error term is verified by evaluating the level of serial correlation between the 
first-differenced error terms, within students, in the first-differenced version of equation (1) below.  The individual 
εit’s are serially uncorrelated if the first-differenced error terms are serially correlated with a magnitude of -0.5.   For 
students in which more than one first-differenced equation is estimated, I estimate that the serial correlation between 
the first-differenced error terms to be -0.45.  Because I am using estimates of the first-differenced error terms to 
estimate this correlation, my estimate will be biased toward zero. 
9 I use robust standard errors for all 2SLS coefficients.  In addition, the differenced error terms are serially correlated 
among students with more than one first-differenced equation in the model (that is, at least 4 test-score records) per 
the previous footnote.  I structurally enforce this property of the error terms in the variance-covariance matrix for 
relevant students.     8 
student  ability  may  be  correlated  with  teacher  selection,  equation  (1)  is  first  differenced.  
Through first differencing, this analysis focuses on within-student variation in teacher quality.  
However, non-random student-teacher assignment is more problematic here than in the larger 
literature that focuses on elementary-level teacher quality because if students are ability-tracked 
across subjects, teacher effects may be biased by other teacher effects.  This section will show 
that  in  the presence of  non-random  student-teacher sorting, multiple teacher  effects  must  be 
included in the model of student achievement to obtain unbiased estimates of any teacher effects.   
 
To see this,  it is  perhaps  most intuitive to discuss an  example  where  it is  not  necessary to 
estimate multiple teacher effects  simultaneously  – when  there is true  random  assignment of 
students to teachers.  For illustration, consider the case where reading achievement is modeled as 
a function of just English teachers and we are interested in estimating the distribution of English-
teacher effects.  For simplicity, assume that there are only two types of teachers in secondary 
school - math and English – and that both types affect student performance in reading.   
 
If  students  are  randomly  assigned  into  math  classrooms,  the  average  math-teacher  quality 
experienced by any given English teacher’s students will be equal to the average math-teacher 
quality experienced by all other English teachers’ students.  That is, there will be no math-
teacher quality bias in the English-teacher effects (measured relative to each other).  For any 
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   9 
If condition (2) holds, unbiased English-teacher effects can be estimated from a simple model 
that omits controls for math teachers.   
 
However, if students are not randomly assigned into math classrooms, the average math-teacher 
quality experienced by students in one English teacher’s classroom need not equal the average 
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In going from the case in (2) to the case in (3), math-teacher quality must be controlled for to 
accurately estimate English-teacher effects.  That is, English teacher effects must be estimated 
conditional on math-teacher quality.   
 
Therefore, given non-random assignment, teacher effects estimated from single-teacher-effect 
models  of  secondary-level  student  performance  will  be  potentially  biased  by  other  teacher 
effects.  One solution to remove this bias is to explicitly model all teacher effects, which is the 
approach taken here.   
 
Although it may be necessary to estimate multiple teacher effects, one concern is that strict 
tracking of students to teachers may prevent these multiple teacher effects from being identified.  
As an example, consider the simple case illustrated in Table 2 where four students are assigned 
to two different English teachers and four different math teachers. 
   10 
Defining each teacher in the table as a separate track, Students 1 and 2 are on different English 
tracks than students 3 and 4.  Similarly, all 4 students are on different math tracks.  One could 
replicate the student types from the table to create an entire population of students that is ability 
grouped  into  the  classrooms  of  these  teachers.    Alternatively,  one  could  replicate  multiple 
“closed-loop” teacher-sharing relationships like the one illustrated in the table.  In either case, 
teacher effects will not be fully identified because the teacher-indicator matrix will be multi-
collinear.   
 
Note, however, that the teacher effects in Table 2 are partially identified.  For example, we can 
compare the effects of math teachers M1 and M2 to each other because students 1 and 2 share an 
English teacher.  Similarly, we can also compare the effects of math teachers M3 and M4 to each 
other.  However, we cannot compare the effects of math teachers M1 and M2 to the effects of 
math teachers M3 and M4 because such a comparison would be biased by any differences in 
teacher quality between English teachers (the effect of English teacher E1 will be assigned to 
math teachers M1 and M2 and the effect of English teacher E2 will be assigned to math teachers 
M3 and M4).  Also, we cannot compare English teachers E1 and E2 to each other because each 
teacher’s effect is confounded with non-overlapping math teacher effects.   
 
In order to identify all teacher effects, at least one student must cross the tracks.  Consider the 
addition of a 5
th student to the scenario from Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
   11 
With the addition of this 5
th student, the teacher-indicator matrix is no longer multi-collinear and 
all teacher effects are fully identified.  The effect of English teacher E2 can be estimated relative 
to English teacher E1 by comparing the test scores of students 2 and 5.  This comparison will tell 
us which teacher is better and by how much.  Trivially, we can use this to compute the variation 
in teacher quality among English teachers.  As was the case in Table 2 previously, the relative 
effects of math teachers M1 and M2 can be identified using the test scores for students 1 and 2.  
Similarly, the relative effects of math teachers M3 and M4 can be identified from the test scores 
of students 3 and 4.  Furthermore, because we know the relative effects for English teachers E1 
and E2 (from students 2 and 5); the effects for math teachers M1 through M4 are comparable.  
Therefore, we can also estimate the variance of math-teacher quality free from any English-
teacher-quality bias.  Notice that all that was required to go from an unidentified model to a fully 
identified model is that a single student crossed the lines of the strict tracking.   
 
Thus, the minimum requirement for the identification of multiple teacher effects is that at least 
one student crosses over and connects each “track” of students such that the teacher-indicator 
matrix is not multi-collinear.  In the extreme case where identification truly relies on a single 
student crossing tracks, teacher effects will only be weakly identified.  To the extent that students 
are heavily mixed across teachers in different subjects, approaching random assignment, teacher 
effects will be strongly identified. 
 
This study is based on administrative data from the San Diego Unified School District (SDUSD).  
The empirical evidence on student dispersion at SDUSD, presented in the next section and in 
Appendix B, suggests that students are widely dispersed across teachers and that, although there   12 
appears to be some student sorting, it is quite mild.  The level of student sorting at SDUSD is 
such that the modeling of multiple teacher effects is both necessary and possible. 
 
 
III.  Data 
 
This study uses matched panel data from the San Diego Unified School District following high 
school students and teachers over time.  SDUSD is the second largest school district in California 
(enrolling over 140,000 students in 1999-2000) and the student population is approximately 27 
percent  white,  37  percent  Hispanic,  18  percent  Asian/Pacific  Islander  and  16  percent  black.  
Twenty-eight percent of the students at SDUSD are English Learners, and 60 percent are eligible 
for meal assistance.  Both of these shares are larger than those of the state of California as a 
whole.  As far as standardized testing performance, students at SDUSD trailed very slightly 
behind  the  national  average  in  reading  in  1999-2000.    On  the  contrary,  SDUSD  students 
narrowly exceeded national norms in math (Betts, Zau and Rice, 2003).  
 
The test-score data are from the Stanford 9 test, a vertically scaled exam, and span the school 
years from 1997-98 through 2001-02.
 10  San Diego does not attach high stakes for teachers to 
test-score performance; however, school-level performance is posted online and available to the 
public.  Students at SDUSD are tested from the eighth through the eleventh grades and the data 




                                                 
10 Because the Stanford 9 is vertically scaled, students’ test scores do not need to be normalized.   Nonetheless, in an 
omitted analysis I verify that all of my results are robust to models where test scores are normalized based on the 
San Diego distribution.  Appendix E provides details on the quantitative properties of the math and reading exams. 
11 Eighth-grade test-scores are used only as (t-2) explanatory variables in the final models.   13 
There  are  16  standard  high  schools  at  SDUSD  and  a  handful  of  other  schools  that  offer 
secondary-level  instruction  (either  charter  schools  or  schools  that  have  an  atypical  grade 
structure  -  for  example,  grades  7  –  12  or  K  –  9).    Among  the  16  standard  high  schools, 
enrollment in 1999-2000 ranged from 849 to 2,945 students.  Among the charter and atypical 
schools, secondary-level enrollment ranged from 26 to 1,039 students.  The data for this study 
are primarily from students attending the standard high schools at SDUSD.  However, some 
students from atypical or charter schools are also included.
12 
 
The modeling structure in equation (1) requires that all students have at least three contiguous 
test-score records at SDUSD (which covers a geographically large area).  Stud ents who do not 
satisfy this criterion are omitted from  the analysis.  I also require that each student have both a 
math and English teacher in each year in which his or her data are used .  This facilitates a 
straightforward  comparison  between  math  and  Eng lish  teachers  by  ensuring  that  they  are 
evaluated using the same student set.
13  Appendix A provides summary statistics showing that 
the final student sample is slightly advantaged relative to the entire student population at SDUSD 
but is generally representative.  In Appendix C, I show that the omission of student fixed effects 
from  the student-achievement  specification  results  in  inaccurate estimates of  teacher fixed 
effects, justifying the empirical approach. 
 
                                                 
12 Data from all charter and atypical schools were not available for this study.  The model includes school fixed 
effects to control for heterogeneity in school types. 
13 I exclude 3.8 percent of the student sample because they are not assigned to a math class in at least one year and 
8.7 percent of the student sample because they are not assigned to an English class in at least one year.  The latter 
group is peculiar because the general high school curriculum is such that each student should take English each year, 
including English learners.  Some of these omissions may reflect students moving in and out of the district over 
time.  Others may be due to missing data.  By grade level, Table 4 details the class-taking behavior of the student 
sample.   14 
For  teachers,  I  expect  sampling  variation  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  estimated  teacher 
effects by analogy to Kane and Staiger’s analysis of school quality (2002).  Thus, I require 
teachers to have at least 20 student-years of data to be included in the analysis.
14  Appendix A 
also provides summary statistics for the teacher sample. 
 
Despite the restrictions imposed on the dataset, it still includes over 1000 teachers and more than 
53,000 test-score records from over 15,000 different students.
15  Because my final samples of 
students and teachers are likely to be more homogeneous than their respective populations given 
the data inclusion restrictions, my results may understate the variance of teacher quality in 
secondary school. 
 
With regard to student sorting, or ability grouping, I use two methods to evaluate the extent of its 
presence at SDUSD.  First, I compare the average realized within-teacher standard deviations of 
students’  period  (t-1)  test  scores  to  analogous  measures  based  on  simulated  student-teacher 
matches that are either randomly generated or perfectly sorted.  If the average realized within-
teacher standard deviations differ from the average within-teacher standard deviations estimated 
from the simulated random assignment, then ability grouping is present.  This approach follows 
Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007).   
 
The first panel of Table 5 compares realized within-teacher standard deviations of period (t-1) 
math test scores to various comparable measures based on simulated classroom assignments for 
                                                 
14 That is, 20 student-years of data from the restricted pool of students.  The results presented in this paper are not 
sensitive to a reasonable range of adjustments to this threshold.  
15  I estimate effects for 346 English teachers, 269 math teachers, 202 science teachers and 184 social studies 
teachers.   15 
each teacher type.  In the second panel, the analysis is repeated using period (t-1) reading test 
scores.  The results are presented as ratios of the standard deviation of interest to the average 
within-grade standard deviation of the relevant test (weighted across grades, calculated using the 
San Diego data). 
 
 
Table 5 shows that although students do not appear to be randomly assigned to teachers; the 
assignment pattern is much closer to what we would expect from random assignment than from 
perfect sorting.  This implies that students are not strongly tracked, at least based on test scores, 
at SDUSD.
16   
 
In addition to showing that students are not strongly sorted  to teachers using the within-teacher 
variance analysis above, I also use teacher-by-teacher Herfindahl indices to show that, generally 
speaking, students are widely dispersed from any given teacher in any subject.   Appendix B 
details this  analysis.  Overall, the  Herfindahl-index approach shows that students are widely 
dispersed to teachers across subjects in the data, corroborating  the evidence from the within -
teacher variance analysis in Table 5.  
 
IV.  Methods 
 
Because  the  analysis  includes  over  1000  teachers,  tables  displaying  individual  coefficient 
estimates for teachers would be difficult to interpret.  Instead, I describe the variance of the 
distribution of teacher quality for each teacher type in each tested subject.  First, I perform Wald 
                                                 
16 This analysis will overstate dispersion because even if students were perfectly sorted based on true ability, noise 
in the test-score measures should create some within-teacher variance.  However, given the magnitudes of the 
numbers in Table 5, measurement error should not influence the primary implication of the table.   16 
tests for the joint significance of the sets of teacher fixed effects using equation (1).  These tests 
evaluate the statistical significance of variation in teacher quality as a determinant of educational 
output and are of the form: 
 
0 1 2 : ... J H          
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In (4),  ˆ   is the Jx1 vector of estimated teacher fixed effects,   is the sample average of the 
ˆ ' j s  ,  ˆ
J V  is the JxJ portion of the estimated variance matrix corresponding to the teacher effects 
being tested and  J   is a Jx1 vector of ones.
17  Under the null hypothesis, W is distributed
2
( 1) J   . 
 
Although the Wald test  is useful for determining statistical significance, it does not provide an 
estimate  of  the  magnitude  of  the  variance  of  teacher  quality.    To  determine  economic 
significance, I empirically estimate the variance of teacher quality.  First, I calculate the total 
fixed-effects variance for each teacher type from the models of student achievement for math and 
reading.  For math teachers, this variance is: 
 
(5)     
( ) ( ) 2
11
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Each fixed-effect coefficient is comprised of two components - one consisting of the true signal 
of teacher quality and the other of estimation error,  ˆ
j j j    .  Equation (5) overstates the 
                                                 
17 The variance matrix used in my Wald tests is the diagonal of the full variance-covariance matrix for the relevant 
set of teacher coefficients.  Substituting the full variance-covariance matrix for the variance matrix has virtually no 
effect on my results.   17 
variance of teacher quality because it includes the variance of the estimation error.  I define the 
estimation-error variance as Var( )   and the variance of the teacher-quality signal, the outcome 
of  interest,  as  () Var  .    To  separate  the  estimation-error  variance  from  the  variance  of  the 
teacher-quality signal, I first assume that  Cov( , )    0.
18  This allows for the total variance of 
the teacher fixed effects to be decomposed as follows: 
 
(6)      ˆ ( ) ( ) +  ( ) Var Var Var      
 
Next, I scale the Wald statistic and use it as an estimate of the ratio between the total fixed-
effects variance and the error variance: 
 
(7)   
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ *[( )'( ) ( )] ( )/ ( )
1
() J J J V Var Var
J
     




Note that because the weighting matrix that I use for the Wald statistic is diagonal: 
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In (8), 
2 ˆ j   is the square of the standard error estimate for the effect of teacher j.  Thus, scaling 
the Wald statistic by the number of teachers returns an estimate of the average ratio of the total 
fixed-effects variance to the error variance.  The magnitude of the variance of the teacher-quality 
signal can be estimated by combining equations (6) and (7).  For example, if the scaled Wald 
statistic is estimated to be A then the magnitude of the variance of the teacher-quality signal is 
estimated by: 
                                                 
18 This assumption is not directly verifiable because both   and   are unobserved.  If for some reason the signal 
and error components of teacher fixed effects were negatively correlated then the results presented here would 
understate the variance of teacher quality.  If the converse were the case, the estimates would be overstated.   18 
 
(9)    ˆˆ ( ) ( ) - ( ( )/ ) Var Var Var A      
 
I use estimates from equation (9) to evaluate the effects of distributional shifts in teacher quality 
on student performance in each tested subject for each teacher type.   
 
This  approach  to  estimating the variance of teacher quality  builds  on the approach used by 
Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007).  In fact, my approach would be identical to the approach 
of these authors if instead of using equation (7), I estimated the ratio of the total-fixed-effects 
variance to the estimation-error variance as: 
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Although equation (10) may seem intuitive, notice that the error variance for the different teacher 
effects  will  not  be  constant.    This  is  because  there  is  heterogeneity  in  the  number  of  student  
observations  across  teachers ,  which  influences  the  precision  of  the  estimates.    With  a  non -
constant error variance across teachers, equation (10) is no longer tied to the more flexible Wald 
statistic.  The appeal of my approach is that my variance estimates are directly tied to the Wald 
statistic through equation (7).  That is, my variance estimates are heteroskedasticity-robust.   
   19 
V.  Results  
 
The Statistical Significance of Teacher Effects 
 
The results from the Wald tests for the statistical significance of variation in teacher quality, by 
teacher type, indicate which teacher inputs affect which test-score outputs in secondary school.
19  
Tables 8  presents results from these tests fo r the math and reading models,  as specified by 
equation (1).  In both cases, I begin with basic models that include only same -subject teachers 
and subsequently consider the inclusion of all possible teacher combinations. 
 
Table 6 shows that variation in teacher quality among same -subject teachers is a stati stically 
significant determinant of test scores in both math and reading for all relevant specifications.
20  
In the reading models, variation in math -teacher quality is also  a  significant determinant of 
performance.  However, the same is not true for variation in English-teacher quality in the math 
models.  Finally, whereas variation in teacher quality among social studies teachers seems to 
affect student outcomes in math and reading, variation in teacher quality among science teachers 
does not affect performance in either subject.   
 
Recall that the teacher effects enter into equation (1) linearly.  However, teacher quality across 
subjects may interact in the production function.  Based on the results from the Wald tests  in 
Table 6, I test to see if teacher-interaction effects belong in the math and reading models.  For 
math production, I add interaction terms between math and social studies tea chers to model (4) 
                                                 
19 The magnitudes of the variances of the raw math and reading test scores are very similar.  The standard deviations 
of these test-score distributions are 35.7 and 37.2, respectively.  The standard deviations of the residuals after taking 
out the within-school-and-student variation are 15.0 and 13.6, respectively. 
20 The exception to this is in the math models that include English-teacher indicator variables.  In each of these 
models the set of math-teacher coefficients is jointly insignificant.  However, the set of English-teacher indicator 
variables clearly does not belong in the math-achievement model.   20 
from  the  first  panel  of Table  6.    For  reading,  I  add  interactions  between  English  and  math 
teachers, English and social studies teachers, and math and social studies teachers to model (5) 
from  the  second  panel  of  Table  6.  To  maintain  consistency  with  my  other  data  inclusion 
restrictions, I require teacher interactions to affect at least 20 students to be estimated. 
 
For the interactions between math and social studies teachers in the math model, I retain the null 
hypothesis  from  the  Wald  test  for  joint  significance  (the  p-value  from  this  test  is  0.70).  
Similarly, for reading output, interactions between English and social studies teachers and math 
and social studies teachers are also jointly insignificant (p-values of 0.95 and 0.97 respectively).  
However, interactions between English and math teachers in the reading model are significant at 
the 1 percent level of confidence.  Furthermore, the inclusion of the math- and English-teacher 
interactions  into  the  reading  model  results  in  social  studies  teachers  becoming  statistically 
insignificant.
21  Therefore, the final reading-achievement specification is not model (5) from the 
second panel of Table 6, but instead includes indicators for just math and English teachers as 
well as interaction terms between these two teacher types.  It excludes both science and social 
studies teachers.  Table 7 details this final reading-achievement specification. 
 
   
Math-Achievement Analysis 
 
I start by evaluating teacher effects from the math-achievement model.  First, I estimate the 
“basic” model that ignores the possibility of joint production among teachers (model (1) in Table 
                                                 
21 The p-value on this new Wald statistic for the inclusion of the social studies teacher indicator variables is 
approximately 0.90.  This result is maintained even if all interactions involving social studies teachers are removed 
from the model (that is, it is the inclusion of the English-math teacher interactions that causes the Wald statistic to 
fall to the point of statistical insignificance).  It may be that, given a five- or six-class schedule, students’ social 
studies teachers are strong predictors of their math and English teacher combinations.  Because of this, I also test for 
the statistical significance of math and English teacher interactions in the math model despite the results from the 
Wald tests in Table 8.  These interaction effects are jointly insignificant in the math specification and the social 
studies teacher indicator variables retain their statistical significance.   21 
8).  Next, I evaluate teacher effects from the full math model where indicator variables for social 
studies teachers are also included (model (4) in Table 8). 
 
For each teacher type and in each model, I report the unadjusted raw variance of teacher fixed 
effects and the adjusted variance of teacher quality as estimated by equation (9).  Results are 
presented as the ratio of the standard deviation of the teacher quality distribution of interest to the 
weighted average of the within-grade standard deviations of test scores (calculated using the San 
Diego data, where the weights correspond to the sample size in each grade).
22  For example, in 
the full model, Table 8 indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in math-teacher quality 
(adjusted) corresponds to a 0.0 68 average within-grade standard deviation improvement in 
student test scores. 
 
The results from the full math model in  Table 8 indicate the tradeoffs in teacher quality across 
subjects required to maintain a given level of achievement growth.   Because the achievement-
growth isoquants of the math educational production function are roughly linear in teacher -
quality space (per the interaction-effect Wald tests in the previous section), I can calculate their 
slope (the marginal rate of technical  substitution, MRTS).  For example,  an equivalent gain in 
math test  scores can be achieved by either a one -standard-deviation increase in math-teacher 
quality or a 1.05-standard-deviation increase in social studies teacher quality. 
 
                                                 
22 This metric is chosen because it allows for the most straightforward comparison of results across studies.  
However, it may be slightly misleading because the model specification in equation (1) does not allow across-school 
or across-student variation in teacher quality while this metric measures teacher quality relative to the total variation 
in test-scores.  Nonetheless, the estimates are sizeable.   22 
The tradeoff in teacher quality between math and social studies teachers is measured by standard 
deviations of each teacher-type’s respective quality distribution.  It does not imply that teacher 
quality across subjects measured in levels, which I cannot observe, will trade off at the same rate.  
For example, if we assume that math-teacher quality is more important in determining math 
outcomes than is social studies teacher quality, the estimated MRTS may simply reflect the fact 
that there is more heterogeneity in quality among social studies teachers.  In this case, a one-
standard-deviation improvement in teacher quality among social studies teachers would represent 
a larger absolute change.  There is suggestive evidence from the credentialing process that math 
teachers may indeed be a more homogenous group than social studies teachers.  For example, the 
first-time pass rate for the math-credentialing exam in California is just 29.2 percent.  For the 
social studies exam, the pass rate is over 62 percent.
23, 24   
 
Regardless of whether the results in Table 8 are driven in part by differences in heterogeneity 
across teacher types, the implication is unchanged.  Improvements in teacher quality among math 
and social studies teachers can have large effects on student achievement in math.
25  Aggregating 
the teacher effects across subjects, a one-standard-deviation improvement in teacher quality can 
be expected to improve student performance by  0.13 within-grade standard deviations of the 
                                                 
23 Passing rates from Report on Passing Rates of Commission-Approved Exams for 2000-01 to 2004-05 from the 
California Commission on Teacher Credentialing released in April 2006 and are for California as a whole.  Reported 
passing rates are from July 2003 through July 2005 and therefore are not directly applicable to the teacher set used 
here.  However, other sources confirm a similar relationship between passing rates on the different exams in the 
1990s.   
24 Another factor that may explain the results in Table 8 is differences in the rigidity of curriculums across math and 
social studies teachers.  For example, a high-school economics teacher can teach a mathematical economics class or 
a non-mathematical economics class, whereas a math teacher has less discretion in curriculum.  Variation in 
curriculums across social studies classes will be captured by the teacher effects, perhaps rightfully so. 
25 Of course if teacher heterogeneity is a major driver of this result, alternative recruitment practices across districts 
could influence which teacher-types affect student performance in which subjects.  However, there is no reason to 
expect SDUSD to be unique among school districts in its recruitment efforts.   23 
test.
26  When compared to the effects of other education al inputs  on secondary-school math 
output, this implies that teacher quality is likely to be the most effective policy -relevant tool at 
the disposal of administrators.
27  For example, one of the more popular policy interventions 
discussed within the educational community is class-size reduction.  Results from independent 
studies by Betts, Zau and Rice (2003) and Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) indicate that 
variation in class size has no effect on student achievement as students move beyond elementary 
school.   
 
Finally, I consider the extent to which variation in  outcome-based teacher quality in math is 
linked to observable teacher qualifications by running another regression where I omit all of the 
teacher  indicator  variables  and  instead  include  controls  for  math  teachers’  experience, 
credentials, education levels and whether or not each math teacher has an undergraduate degree 
in mathematics.
28  None of these observable teacher qualifications have statistically significant 




For reading, I again start by  evaluating teacher effects from the basic model in which joint 
production among teachers is ignored and student performance is attributed solely to variation in 
                                                 
26 The estimates here are somewhat smaller than estimates reported by Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007).  This 
may have to do with differences in the testing instruments employed to estimate teacher effects in the two studies.  
Aaronson, Barrow and Sander report that in their study, student test-score growth differs substantially by students’ 
initial achievement levels and that high-achieving students experience much larger test-score gains from 8
th to 9
th 
grade (the grades studied by these authors).  In the presence of positive student-teacher matching, this would be 
expected to inflate the variance of their estimated teacher effects.  Nonetheless, my estimates confirm their general 
result that variation in teacher quality is an important determinant of student outcomes in secondary school. 
27 The body of literature that estimates the effects of observable educational inputs on student outputs is vast.  See 
Hanushek (1986, 1996) for literature surveys.  
28 For experience, I estimate models that allow experience to enter linearly (up to 10 years of experience) and also 
models that include indicator variables for teachers with two or less years of experience.  I also control for whether 
teachers have a master’s degree and whether they are fully credentialed.   24 
English-teacher quality.  I then evaluate the complete reading achievement model as described 
by model (9) in Table 7. 
 
Similarly to the math analysis, the variance estimates from the full reading model in Table 9 
indicate the tradeoffs in teacher quality across subjects required to maintain a given level of 
achievement growth.  However, unlike for math, the reading production function is not strictly 
linear in teacher-quality inputs.   
 
The nonlinearity between math- and English-teacher quality may represent some combination of 
the  effects  of  teacher  matching/cooperation,  possibly  teamwork,  and  the  effect  of  the 
compounding of teacher quality across subjects (i.e., increasing or decreasing returns).  Because 
the  data  do  not  contain  direct  information  on  teacher  quality,  which  I  measure  by  student 
outcomes,  these  effects  are  difficult  to  disentangle.    However,  by  examining  the  interaction 
effects for teachers of different quality levels, it is possible to at least partially identify the extent 
to which the teacher interactions reflect increasing or decreasing returns to teacher quality across 
subjects.   
 
To do this, I first divide the English and math teacher effects into separate, subject-specific 
vectors.  Within each vector, teachers are ranked from 1 to P and 1 to J, respectively, based on 
their value-added coefficients as estimated by the full reading model.  Using these rankings, I 
assign all teachers to quality quintiles, where quintile-5 teachers are those with the highest value-
added.   
   25 
Recall from Section V that in order to maintain consistency throughout the analysis, interaction 
effects are estimated only for pairs of teachers who share 20 or more students.  There are 493 
non-exclusive pairs of teachers that meet this criterion in the data panel.  Of the full samples of 
English and math teachers, 53 and 60 percent of these teachers, respectively, are part of at least 
one such pair.  After ranking all teachers in each subject based on value-added to identify each 
teacher’s quintile assignment, I use just the subsample of teachers who are involved in at least 
one interaction for the remainder of the interaction analysis. 
 
Ignoring the interaction effects momentarily, I use the quintile rankings to estimate the baseline 
effects of teacher quality on student performance, by quintile set.  A quintile set is defined by the 
pair of quintile rankings for a set of English and math teachers (for example, the set (1,4) would 
indicate an English-teacher quintile ranking of “1” and a math-teacher quintile ranking of “4”).  
Table 10 reports average baseline teacher effects – the sum of the average math-teacher effect 
and the average English-teacher effect, ignoring interactions - for students whose teachers are 
from any given quintile set.  The by-quintile teacher-quality effects are centered around the (3,3) 
quintile, which is set to zero for ease of comparison.  The cell entries are presented in terms of 
the same weighted average of the within-grade standard deviations of the test as the results in 
Table 9.
29   
 
By structure, the entries in Table 10 must be non-decreasing moving down and to the right.  The 
table  reflects  the  trivial  fact  that  when  teacher  quality  is  measured  in  terms  of  student 
performance, the sum of the teacher effects for teachers in higher quintile sets will be larger.   
                                                 
29 Because Table 10 displays average effects, the estimates are not adjustable for estimation error as are the variance 
estimates in Table 9.  However, if the estimation error is independent of teachers’ quintile rankings, the average 
estimation error in each cell of Table 10 should be zero.   26 
 
Next, Table 11 incorporates the interaction effects and reports, by-quintile, average total teacher 
effects.  Each cell in Table 11 is calculated as the sum of two components: (1) the analogous 
entry from Table 10 and (2) the average interaction effect corresponding to the relevant quintile 
set.  Table 11 is again centered around the (3,3) quintile. 
 
Table 11 largely retains the pattern of effects from Table 10, with two noteworthy exceptions.  
First, Table 11 is no longer strictly increasing moving down and to the right.  For example, the 
table appears to imply that a student with a quintile-1 English teacher is better off with a quintile-
3 math teacher than a quintile-4 math teacher.  Although a literal read of the table might imply as 
much, this unintuitive jump is more likely the result of idiosyncrasies in the interaction effects 
and the arbitrariness of the quintile cutoffs.  For example, the jumps in the table would shift 
around if teachers were divided by quartiles or sextiles instead of quintiles.  Also, the averages in 
each cell are calculated based on relatively few pairs of teachers (ranging from just 5 to 31 pairs) 
and thus, they can be unduly influenced by a particular interaction or set of interactions.  Because 
of  these  limitations,  Table  11  is  more  useful  for  evaluating  general  trends  than  for  making 
narrow comparisons across particular quintile sets (the same is true for Table 10, and for Table 
12 to come). 
 
The second noteworthy difference between Tables 10 and 11 is that the returns to teacher quality 
are less uniform once the interaction effects are incorporated.  The pattern of non-uniformity 
introduced by the interaction effects implies that the interactions are at least partially reflective of 
decreasing  returns  to  teacher  quality  across  subjects.    To  show  this  more  clearly,  Table  12   27 
isolates the interaction effects.  Table 12 is generated by the cell-by-cell subtraction of Table 10 
from Table 11. 
 
Looking at Table 12, evidence of decreasing returns to teacher quality across subjects emerges.  
For example, consider a student who is taught by a bottom-quintile teacher in each subject.  At 
this  initially-low  level  of  quality,  the  interaction  effects  show  that  improvements  in  teacher 
quality have large effects above and beyond the baseline effects.  Moving southeast in the table, 
the interaction-based returns to improvements in teacher quality generally decline.  For example, 
for a student who is taught by 4
th-quintile English and math teachers, improvements in teacher 
quality  to  the  5
th  quintile  in  each  subject  will  have  a  net  effect  that  is  less  than  that  of  an 
equivalent move starting from an initially-lower quality level. 
 
Because the production of reading output involves teacher interactions, estimating the effect of 
improvements in teacher quality on student performance is less straightforward than in the math 
analysis.  However, generally speaking, the estimates in Tables 9 and 11 indicate that the effect 
of a one-standard-deviation improvement in math- and/or English-teacher quality can have a 
substantial effect on student performance.   
 
Analogously to the math analysis, I evaluate the extent to which variation in outcome-based 
teacher quality in reading can be explained by observable teacher qualifications by removing all 
of the teacher indicator variables from equation (1) and replacing them with controls for English 
teachers’  experience,  credentials,  education  levels  and  whether  or  not  each  teacher  has  an 
undergraduate  degree  in  English.    Only  the  coefficient  on  the  master’s  degree  indicator  is   28 
statistically significant and the implied effect is small.
30  As in the math analysis, compared to 
the larger educational production literature that considers the effects of observable inputs such as 
spending per pupil and class-size reductions, the reading analysis indicates very large teacher -
quality effects that are virtually unrelated to observable teacher qualifications. 
 
VI.  The Superstar Teacher Hypothesis 
 
The analysis from the previous section shows that math teachers affect achievement in math and 
reading.  Does this mean that some math teachers are so great that they positively affect both 
math and reading performance, the proverbial “superstar teacher” effect, or similarly, so bad that 
they  negatively  affect  performance  in  both  subjects?    Or  does  this  instead  imply  that  math 
teachers are making tradeoffs that influence their effectiveness in math and reading and that 
generally speaking, performance in one subject is obtained at a cost in the other?  This question 
can be addressed by analyzing the correlation of math-teacher effects across subjects.   A strong 
positive correlation would provide support for the superstar teacher hypothesis. 
 
Define    m as the vector of estimated math-teacher coefficients from the full math model and    r  
as the vector of estimated math-teacher coefficients from the full reading model.  The correlation 
between these two vectors is 0.31.  However, this correlation defin es the relationship between 
( m+m) and (  r+r), not   m  and   r  (where  m  and  r  represent estimation error).  
Furthermore, the relationship between  m  and  r  is unclear  a  priori.    Following  Rockoff 
(2004), by assuming that the correlation of true teacher quality across subjects for all teachers is 
the same, I can get an idea of the direction of the bias introduced by the measurement error.  
                                                 
30 Having an English teacher with a master’s degree is estimated to improve performance by .01 within-grade 
standard deviations of the test.   29 
Measurement  error  will  be  smaller  for  teachers  with  a  greater  number  of  student-year 
observations.  Therefore, I compare the correlation coefficient between    m  and    r  for a subset 
of teachers who have a relatively high number of students to an analogous correlation coefficient 
from the entire teacher sample to get an idea of the direction of the bias from  m and r on the 
initial quality-correlation estimate.  The estimated correlation coefficient from the selected subset 
of teachers is higher than its counterpart from the full teacher set.  Thus, measurement error is 
biasing the estimate of the correlation of teacher quality across subjects toward zero  for math 
teachers.  The initial estimate of the correlation between    m  and    r , 0.31, can be treated as a 
lower-bound estimate of the correlation of math-teacher quality across subjects.   
 
To estimate an upper bound on the correlation of math-teacher quality across subjects, I estimate 
the correlation between   m  and  r under the assumption that the true correlation between  m  
and  r is zero (See Appendix D for details).  This upper-bound estimate does not exclude the 
possibility that the correlation of math-teacher quality across subjects is equal to 1.  The bounded 
estimate of the correlation of math-teacher quality across subjects (0.31 to 1.00) supports the 
superstar teacher hypothesis.
31   
                                                 
31 The identification of the mechanism by which math teachers affect reading performance is beyond the scope of 
this project.  It may be that math teachers directly influence reading skills through their teaching (e.g., by focusing 
on word problems that improve reading comprehension).  Alternatively, it may be that math teachers are particularly 
important to student confidence and motivation.  In the education literature, there is a term for the distress to 
students caused by math – “Mathematics Anxiety” (see, for example, Hembree, 1990).  Additionally, popular media 
has argued that algebra is a particularly devastating subject for some students’ confidence levels (Helfand, 2006).   30 
VII.  Test Scores and Teacher Accountability in Secondary School 
 
Value-added is of particular policy relevance in the context of teacher accountability.
32  If a 
school district were interested in incorporati ng value-added into an accountability system  for 
secondary-school teachers, the results from this analysis  are informative because they identify 
which teacher inputs influence which test-score outputs and provide estimates of the effects of 
distributional shifts in  teacher quality by teacher type.   Here I address an  additional question 
related  to  the  practical  implementation  of  value -added  as  an  accountability  too l:  how  do 
decisions regarding which teachers to include in the models of student achievement affect 
teacher rankings based on value -added?  The answer to this question is important because 
political as well as economic considerations may be involved in the  design of an accountability 
system. 
 
To analyze the rank-changing effects of different levels of teacher inclusion into the models of 
student achievement, I consider  a simple  accountability system in which math teachers are 
evaluated based on their rankin gs  in terms of math  value-added  and English teachers are 
evaluated based on their rankings in terms of reading value-added.
33  First, for math teachers, I 
estimate the basic math model that assumes only math teachers affect student math performance 
(Table 8, panel 1).  I keep the vector of math -teacher coefficients and rank them from 1 to J, 1 
being the lowest and J being the highest.  Next, I estimate the full  math model that also allows 
                                                 
32 Although value-added estimation is inherently noisy, there is evidence in the literature that value-added estimates 
may be more useful for evaluating teacher effectiveness than the measures currently employed by most school 
districts.  See, for example, Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007), Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005), and Koedel 
and Betts (2007). 
33 I assign each teacher an overall quality ranking despite the fact that performance is measured within schools.  If 
there is significant between-school sorting in terms of teacher quality, the rankings I assign will be less comparable 
across schools.    31 
for social studies teachers to also affect math performance (Table 8, panel 2).  From this model, I 
keep just the vector of coefficients for math teachers and again rank them from 1 to J.   
 
For each vector of math-teacher coefficients, I divide teachers into quintiles based on their value-
added rankings, where quintile-5 teachers are those with the highest  value-added.  Table 13 
compares  the  stability  of  these  quintile  assignments  across  the  different  models  of  student 
achievement.  Each cell entry in Table 13 indicates the percentage of teachers who fall into a 
given quintile set, where a quintile set is defined by the pair of quintile-rankings for a given 
teacher in both models (here, the set (1,4) for a math teacher would indicate a quintile ranking of 
“1” in the basic model and “4” in the full model).  The vertical dimension represents teachers’ 
quintile rankings from the basic model and the horizontal dimension teachers’ rankings from the 
full model.  The correlation between the two vectors of math-teacher coefficients is 0.95.   
 
If math teachers’ value-added coefficients were independent of social studies teachers’ value-
added and if the inclusion of the social studies teachers into the model did not introduce any 
additional  noise,  the  diagonal  entries  of  Table  13  would  all  equal  100  percent  and  the  off-
diagonal entries would all equal zero.  Although this is certainly not the case in the center of the 
matrix, the corners of the matrix indicate that the best and worst math teachers are generally 
identified regardless of whether social studies teachers are included or not.  Importantly, it is 
precisely these teachers who we would expect to target in an accountability system.  Thus, for 
relevant  teachers,  Table  13  implies  a  relatively  low  omitted  variables  bias  generated  by  the 
omission of social studies teachers in the basic math model and indicates that a simple teacher-
accountability  system  that  rewarded  math  teachers  based  on  such  a  model  should  perform   32 
relatively well.  Put differently, Table 13 shows that objections to the assignment of teacher 
accountability in secondary school based on the contamination of teacher effects across subjects, 
at least among the highest- and lowest-ranked teachers, would be largely misguided. 
 
Next,  I  perform  an  analogous  exercise  for  English  teachers  in  the  reading  achievement 
specification.  In this case, I compare the basic model that includes only English-teacher effects 
to the full model detailed in Table 9 (including English and math teachers as well as interactions 
between the two).  The quintile stability results are displayed in Table 14.  For this analysis, the 
correlation between the two vectors of English-teacher coefficients is 0.87. 
 
The results in Table 14 are similar to those in Table 13.  For English teachers, switching between 
the models of student achievement has a slightly larger effect on teachers’ rankings.  However, 
the best and worst teachers are still consistently identified.   
 
The evidence here supports previous work showing that value-added modeling is most consistent 
in identifying the best and worst teachers regardless of the type of distortion introduced for 
comparison (e.g., adjustments in time, student sample, or in this case, model completeness).
34  
Value-added modeling will be most useful in an accountability system that focuses on these 
teachers, which is what seems most reasonable.   
 
VIII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The teacher quality literature has generally ignored teacher spillover effects in secondary school 
with little empirical or theoretical justification.  By modeling student achievement in secondary 
                                                 
34 Also see Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007) and Koedel and Betts (2007).   33 
school  as  a  function  of  multiple  teacher  inputs,  I  show  that  educational  output  is  jointly 
produced.    Specifically,  math  production  is  jointly  determined  by  math  and  social  studies 
teachers  and  reading  production  by  math  and  English  teachers.    In  each  tested  subject, 
distributional  shifts  in  teacher  quality  for  both  same-subject  and  off-subject  teachers  have 
economically meaningful effects on student outcomes.   
 
The  presence  teacher  spillover  effects  implies  that  there  are  additional  margins  by  which 
secondary schools can benefit from policies aimed at improving teacher quality.  For example, 
policies aimed at improving math teacher quality can improve reading performance in addition to 
math performance.  Furthermore, in subjects where there is a general shortage of high-quality 
teachers (e.g., math), schools can compensate for a lack of quality in one subject by improving 
quality in another.  Overall, the failure to account for teacher spillover effects, which are shown 
here to be large, can lead to a significant understatement of the value of teacher quality as an 
educational resource in secondary school. 
 
The  results  here  are  applicable  to  incentive  design  and  teacher  accountability.    A  natural 
extension of this work would be to determine what a system of teacher accountability might look 
like  in  practice,  taking  into  account  considerations  that  could  not  be  evaluated  here.    For 
example,  one  concern  with  the  implementation  of  across-subject  teacher  incentives  is  that 
teachers may respond by taking focus away from important material in their primary subjects of 
instruction.  The degree to which across-subject teacher incentives would illicit such behavioral 
responses is unclear.  Furthermore, depending on the objective function of the school district, 
these behavioral responses may or may not be desirable.  For example, if a school district’s   34 
objective function disproportionately favors math achievement, the district may prefer for social 
studies  teachers  to  substitute  into  material  that improves  problem-solving  skills,  even  at  the 
expense of the traditional social-studies curriculum.  Without more information about the nature 
of school districts’ objective functions, it is impossible to evaluate the course-material tradeoffs 
that are likely to be associated with the implementation of across-subject teacher incentives in 
secondary school. 
 
A second concern with across-subject incentives is that if they were improperly implemented, 
they could increase rather than decrease free-riding opportunities among teachers.  Evidence 
from  Mas  and  Moretti  (2007)  indicates  that  social  pressure  and  mutual  monitoring  among 
teacher peer groups may somewhat alleviate this concern, particularly if across-subject teacher 
incentives are administered in relevant subjects such that teachers can easily observe each others’ 
productivities.  Additionally, if across-subject teacher incentives were to promote the formation 
of teams among teachers, research by Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) implies that the 
positive effects of teamwork could dominate any negative effects of free-riding.  The analysis 
here implies that these issues, drawn from the more general literature on joint production and 
production in teams, merit attention within the context of secondary education.   35 
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Table 1. Description of Key Data Elements 
Time-Varying Student 
Characteristics 
Indicators for grade level, parental education, whether student is EL 
(EL  =  English  Learner),  re-designated  from  EL  to  English 
proficient, switched schools, accelerated a grade, held back a grade, 




Controls for the racial makeup and heterogeneity of school, school 
size,  whether  school  is  year  round,  whether  school  is  charter  or 
atypical,  percent  of  school  on  free  lunch,  percent  of  school  EL, 






Class size, peer achievement in year (t-1) - both subject-specific; 
subject  and  level  of  classes  taken  (for  example,  algebra  or 





Table 2. Example of Strict Student Tracking  
  English Teachers 
 
Math Teachers 















2  1  0  0  1  0  0 
3  0  1  0  0  1  0 
4  0  1  0  0  0  1 
 
 
Table 3. Example of Strict Student Tracking Being Broken by a Single Student 
  English Teachers 
 
Math Teachers 
Student  E1 
 
E2  M1  M2  M3  M4 
1  1  0  1  0  0  0 
2  1  0  0  1  0  0 
3  0  1  0  0  1  0 
4  0  1  0  0  0  1 
5  0  1  0  1  0  0   36 
Table 4. Class-Taking Behavior of the Student Sample by Grade Level 
  Ninth Grade  Tenth Grade  Eleventh Grade 
Classes Taken       
Math  100%  100%  100% 
English  100%  100%  100% 
Science  45%  88%  83% 
Social Studies  82%  24%  99% 
Science and Social Studies  27%  17%  82% 





Table 5.  Average Within-Teacher Standard Deviations of Students’ Period (t-1) Test 
Scores in Math and Reading, by Teacher Type. 
    Within Schools  Across District 








           
Math Test Scores           
Math Teachers  0.76  0.93  0.16  0.97  <0.01 
English Teachers  0.76  0.92  0.14  0.96  <0.01 
Science Teachers  0.78  0.91  0.20  0.96  <0.01 
Social Studies Teachers  0.77  0.94  0.20  0.97  <0.01 
           
Reading Test Scores           
Math Teachers  0.77  0.86  0.15  0.90  <0.01 
English Teachers  0.70  0.85  0.13  0.89  <0.01 
Science Teachers  0.77  0.86  0.18  0.90  <0.01 
Social Studies Teachers  0.72  0.87  0.19  0.91  <0.01 
Note:  In the “Perfect Sorting” columns, students are sorted by period (t-1) test-score levels in math.  For the 
randomized assignments, students are assigned to teachers based on a randomly generated number from a uniform 
distribution.  The random assignments are repeated 25 times and estimates are averaged across all random 
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Table 6.  P-Values from Wald Tests for the Joint Significance of Teacher Indicator 
Variables in the Math and Reading Models of Student Achievement, by Teacher Type  
  Statistical Significance for Teacher Indicator 
Variables by Subject 
Teachers Included by Model  Mathematics  English  Science  Social Studies 
         
Math Model         
1. Mathematics Only  <0.01**  -  -  - 
2. Mathematics and English   0.19  0.87  -  - 
3. Mathematics and Science  <0.01**  -  0.33  - 
4. Mathematics and Social Studies  <0.01**  -  -  <0.01** 
5. Mathematics, English and Science  0.19  0.98  0.44  - 
6. Mathematics, English and Social Studies  0.46  0.95  -  0.01** 
7. Mathematics, Science and Social Studies  <0.01**  -  0.51  <0.01** 
8. Mathematics, English, Science and Social Studies  0.15  0.98  0.48  0.08 
         
Reading Model         
1. English Only  -  <0.01**  -  - 
2. English and Mathematics   <0.01**  <0.01**  -  - 
3. English and Social Studies  -  <0.01**  -  <0.01** 
4. English and Science  -  <0.01**  0.27  - 
5. English, Mathematics and Social Studies  <0.01**  <0.01**  -  <0.01** 
6. English, Mathematics and Science  <0.01**  <0.01**  0.34  - 
7. English, Social Studies and Science  -  <0.01**  0.59  <0.01** 
8. English, Mathematics, Social Studies and Science  <0.01**  <0.01**  0.27  <0.01** 





Table 7.  Final Reading Achievement Model and Associated P-Values from Wald Tests 
  Statistical Significance for Teacher Indicator 
Variables by Subject 
Teachers Included by Model 
Mathematics  English  English-Mathematics 
Interactions 
9. English, Mathematics and English-
Mathematics Teacher Interactions 
<0.01**  <0.01**  <0.01** 
Notes:  ** indicates significance with p-value ≤ 0.01 
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Table 8.  Estimated Effects of a One-Standard-Deviation Change in Teacher Quality on 
Student Math Achievement 
  Teachers Indicator Variables Included, by Model 
 
  Model 1: 
Math Teachers Only 
  Model 2:  
Math and Social Studies Teachers 
 
  Unadjusted  Adjusted    Unadjusted  Adjusted 
           
Math Teachers  0.147  0.080    0.142  0.068 
           
Social Studies Teachers        0.110  0.065 





Table 9.  Estimated Effects of a One-Standard-Deviation Change in Teacher Quality on 
Student Reading Achievement 
  Teachers Indicator Variables Included, by Model 
 
  Basic Model: 
English Teachers Only 
  Full Model:  
English, Math and English-Math 
Teacher Interactions 
 
  Unadjusted  Adjusted    Unadjusted  Adjusted 
           
English Teachers  0.138  0.092    0.151  0.086 
           
Math Teachers        0.131  0.078 
           
English-Math Teacher 
Interactions 
      0.166  0.096 
           
   39 
Table 10.  Average Baseline Effects of Teacher Quality, Excluding Interaction Effects, on 
Student Reading Performance by the Quintile Assignments of Each Teacher Type in their 
Respective Quality Distributions 





  1  2  3  4  5 
1  -0.37**  -0.27**  -0.25**  -0.16**  -0.14** 
2  -0.24**  -0.14**  -0.08**  -0.02  0.08** 
3  -0.16**  -0.07**  0.00  0.08**  0.16** 
4  -0.07**  0.01  0.06**  0.14**  0.23** 
5  -0.03  0.08**  0.17**  0.27**  0.31** 
Notes:  **Significantly different from the effect in the (3,3) quintile set at the at 1% level of confidence. 
*Significantly different from the effect in the (3,3) quintile set at the at 5% level of confidence. 
The results in this Table are based on 493 interactions between math and English teachers that affected at 
least 20 students in the dataset.  The number of observations per cell ranges from 5 to 31.  Estimates in just 
two cells are based on less than 10 observed interactions.  Quintile-5 teachers are those with the highest 
value-added, quintile-1 teachers the lowest. 
 
 
Table 11.  Average Total Effects of Teacher Quality on Student Reading Performance by 
the Quintile Assignments of Each Teacher Type in their Respective Quality Distributions 





  1  2  3  4  5 
1  -0.29**  -0.08**  -0.04*  -0.11**  -0.04* 
2  -0.06**  0.01  0.07**  0.00  0.11** 
3  -0.08**  0.07**  0.00  0.13**  0.18** 
4  0.01  0.05*  0.09**  0.16**  0.27** 
5  0.01  0.03*  0.17**  0.09**  0.24** 
Notes:  **Significantly different from the effect in the (3,3) quintile set at the at 1% level of confidence. 
*Significantly different from the effect in the (3,3) quintile set at the at 5% level of confidence. 
The results in this Table are based on 493 interactions between math and English teachers that affected at 
least 20 students in the dataset.  The number of observations per cell ranges from 5 to 31.  Estimates in just 
two cells are based on less than 10 observed interactions.  Quintile-5 teachers are those with the highest 
value-added, quintile-1 teachers the lowest. 
 
Table 12.  Isolated Interaction Effects by the Quintile Assignments of Each Teacher Type 
in their Respective Quality Distributions for the Reading Analysis 





  1  2  3  4  5 
1  0.08**  0.19**  0.20**  0.06**  0.10** 
2  0.18**  0.15**  0.15**  0.02  0.03 
3  0.09**  0.14**  0.00  0.05*  0.02 
4  0.08**  0.04*  0.03  0.02  0.04* 
5  0.04*  -0.05*  0.01  -0.18**  -0.07** 
Notes:  **Significantly different from the effect in the (3,3) quintile set at the at 1% level of confidence. 
*Significantly different from the effect in the (3,3) quintile set at the at 5% level of confidence. 
The results in this Table are based on 493 interactions between math and English teachers that affected at 
least 20 students in the dataset.  The number of observations per cell ranges from 5 to 31.  Estimates in just 
two cells are based on less than 10 observed interactions.  Quintile-5 teachers are those with the highest 
value-added, quintile-1 teachers the lowest.   40 
Table 13.  Stability of Math-Teacher Value-Added Coefficients Going From the Basic to 
the Full Model of Student Math Achievement 




the Basic Model 
  1  2  3  4  5 
1  87%  9%  4%  0%  0% 
2  11%  60%  26%  2%  0% 
3  0%  27%  47%  24%  2% 
4  2%  2%  25%  58%  13% 





Table 14.  Stability of English-Teacher Value-Added Coefficients Going From the Basic to 
the Full Model of Student Reading Achievement 




the Basic Model 
  1  2  3  4  5 
1  78%  20%  1%  0%  0% 
2  19%  49%  22%  7%  3% 
3  3%  20%  41%  25%  12% 
4  1%  9%  29%  36%  25% 
5  0%  1%  6%  32%  61% 
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Table A.1.  Key Differences Between the Entire SDUSD High School Student Sample and 
the Final Sample Used for Estimation 
 
  All Students  Students with 3 + Years of Data 
 
Race 
   % White 
   % Black 
   % Asian 
   % Hispanic 
    
% English Learners 
 
SAT 9 Math Score* 
SAT 9 Reading Score* 
 
Avg. Percentage of School 





























My final sample includes 15,877 unique students with at least 3 consecutive years of test-score data out of a possible 
32,740 students who could have potentially been eligible to be included based on the year that they started 9
th or 10
th 
grade.  The majority of the omitted students are omitted because they do not have three contiguous years of test-
score data. 
*Test score performance is measured in average standard deviations from the “All Students” mean (by grade).  The 
“all students” group includes all students at SDUSD over the entire course of the panel who had at least one 
completed test-score record in 9
th, 10
th or 11
th grade.   43 
Table A.2.  Key Differences Between the Entire SDUSD Teacher Sample and the Final 
Sample Used for Estimation – Math. 
 
  All Teachers Who Taught at 
Least 50 Students in Math 





% Fully Credentialed 
% With Masters Degree 
 
BA Major: 
  Math 
  Education 
  Any Science 





























Table A.3.  Key Differences Between the Entire SDUSD Teacher Sample and the Final 
Sample Used for Estimation - English 
 
  All Teachers Who Taught at 
Least 50 Students in English 





% Fully Credentialed 
% With Masters Degree 
 
BA Major: 
  English 
  Education 
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Table A.4.  Key Differences Between the Entire SDUSD Teacher Sample and the Final 
Sample Used for Estimation - Science 
 
  All Teachers Who Taught at 
Least 50 Students in Science 





% Fully Credentialed 
% With Masters Degree 
 
BA Major: 
  Biology 
  Chemistry 
  GeoScience 
  Physics 
  Math 
  Education 



































Table A.5.  Key Differences Between the Entire SDUSD Teacher Sample and the Final 
Sample Used for Estimation – Social Studies 
 
  All Teachers Who Taught at Least 
50 Students in Social Studies 
Social Studies Teachers 




% Fully Credentialed 
% With Masters Degree 
 
BA Major: 
  Social Science 
  Education 
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Table B.1.  Average and Median Per-Teacher Herfindahl Indices for Each Teacher Type to 
Each Teacher Type 
  Herfindahl Indices 
  Mean  Median 
Math Teachers     
To English Teachers  0.12  0.11 
To Science Teachers  0.10  0.08 
To Social Studies Teachers  0.10  0.09 
     
English Teachers     
To Math Teachers  0.15  0.13 
To Science Teachers  0.14  0.12 
To Social Studies Teachers  0.16  0.10 
     
Science Teachers     
To English Teachers  0.18  0.13 
To Math Teachers  0.18  0.14 
To Social Studies Teachers  0.11  0.08 
     
Social Studies Teachers     
To English Teachers  0.21  0.16 
To Math Teachers  0.17  0.12 
To Science Teachers  0.11  0.08 
Note:  Unlike in math and English, students do not take science and social studies every year.  To 
appropriately reflect the dispersion created by students without social studies and/or science 
teachers, each student who did not have one of these teachers was treated as going into a unique 
bin. 
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Table B.2.  Average and Median Per-Teacher Herfindahl Indices for Each Teacher Type to 
Each Teacher Type for a Single Year (1999-2000) 
  Herfindahl Indices 
  Mean  Median 
Math Teachers     
To English Teachers  0.16  0.13 
To Science Teachers  0.12  0.10 
To Social Studies Teachers  0.12  0.10 
     
English Teachers     
To Math Teachers  0.20  0.19 
To Science Teachers  0.17  0.13 
To Social Studies Teachers  0.23  0.18 
     
Science Teachers     
To English Teachers  0.19  0.17 
To Math Teachers  0.18  0.16 
To Social Studies Teachers  0.11  0.08 
     
Social Studies Teachers     
To English Teachers  0.27  0.19 
To Math Teachers  0.20  0.18 
To Science Teachers  0.14  0.12 
Note:  Unlike in math and English, students do not take science and social studies every year.  To 
appropriately reflect the dispersion created by students without social studies and/or science 
teachers, each student who did not have one of these teachers was treated as going into a unique 
bin. 
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Table C.1. Specification Robustness Checks for the Full Math and Reading Models 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Included Explanatory Variables         
(A)  Lagged Test Score  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
(B)  Student-Level Covariates   No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
(C)  School- and Classroom-Level  Covariates, 
School and Subject Fixed Effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
(D)  Student Fixed Effects (First Differenced)  No  No  No  Yes 
         
Full Math Model          
         
Math Teachers         
P-value from Wald Test for Inclusion into Model  <.01**  <.01**  <.01**  <.01** 
Adjusted Variance Estimate  0.158  0.148  0.065  0.068 
Correlation Coefficient  0.31  0.33  0.64  1 
         
Social Studies Teachers         
P-value from Wald Test for Inclusion into Model  <.01**  <.01**  <.01**  <.01** 
Adjusted Variance Estimate  0.133  0.123  0.077  0.065 
Correlation Coefficient  0.56  0.56  0.66  1 
         
         
Full Reading Model          
         
English Teachers         
P-value from Wald Test for Inclusion into Model  <.01**  <.01**  <.01**  <.01** 
Adjusted Variance Estimate  0.140  0.131  0.108  0.086 
Correlation Coefficient  0.35  0.40  0.61  1 
         
Math Teachers         
P-value from Wald Test for Inclusion into Model  <.01**  <.01**  <.01**  <.01** 
Adjusted Variance Estimate  0.108  0.099  0.073  0.078 
Correlation Coefficient  0.24  0.25  0.59  1 
         
         
Notes:  Correlation coefficients compare teacher effects weighted by their standard errors.  All models include 
indicator variables for students’ grade levels.  Column 4 shows the full specification to which the restricted 
specifications in columns 1 through 3 are compared.  In columns 1 through 3, the models were estimated without 
first differencing.  For these specifications, additional time-invariant student-level characteristics are included 
(specifically, information on race and gender) and errors are clustered at the student level.   
 




Section I illustrates the statistical model that seems most appropriate for accurately describing 
student  test-score  performance.    This  model  accounts  for  numerous  sources  of  variation  in 
student achievement including variation due to student fixed effects, all within the value-added 
framework.  The structure of the model requires at least three contiguous test scores per student 
for full identification.  This data inclusion restriction reduces the available sample of students. 
 
Additionally, I require that each student have both a math and English teacher in each year in 
which his or her data are used, as discussed in the text.  Together, the data restrictions may bias 
the estimated variances of teacher quality downward by reducing student heterogeneity.  Table 
A.1 details the differences between the final sample of students used in my analysis and the 
general high school population at SDUSD. 
 
As would be predicted, my final student sample is slightly advantaged relative to the SDUSD 
high school population as a whole.  However, it is still quite diverse and generally representative 
of the demographics at SDUSD.  The biggest difference between the two student populations is 
in terms of testing performance.  Note that the “all students” sample includes students who are 
movers in the sense that they do not have three contiguous test scores.  Thus, Table A.1 is 
consistent  with  the  well-documented  negative  relationship  between  student  mobility  and 
performance  (see,  for  example,  Rumberger  and  Larson,  1998;  or  Ingersoll,  Scamman  and 
Eckerling, 1989).   49 
 
With respect to teachers, I also impose participation restrictions.  Kane and Staiger (2002) show 
that sampling variation has a significant impact on the outcomes of incentive systems based on 
school-level mean performance measures.  Particularly, they find that schools with the smallest 
populations are considerably more likely to receive a reward or to be sanctioned based on student 
performance because the variance of the average of students’ test scores from year to year is 
highest in these schools.  A magnified version of this problem arises in my teacher analysis.  In 
an effort to reduce the impact of sampling variation, I require that teachers have at least 20 
student-years of data from my student sample to be included in the analysis.
35   
 
Tables A.2 through A.5 detail key differences between the entire SDUSD high school teacher 
population and the sample used in this study, by subject.  In these comparisons, it was not cle ar 
how to assign the excluded teachers to a given subject.  Specifically, it was unclear how many 
classes a teacher should have to teach in a given subject to constitute assignment to that subject.  
Ultimately, I included teachers into the “all teachers” sample for a given subject if, in aggregate, 
they taught at least 50 student-years in that subject over the course of the data panel (in this case, 
student  years were counted for all students).  This  number was  chosen as  it corresponds  to 
roughly 2 class periods of students.  For each of the tables below, as I increase the student-years 
threshold for the “all teachers” samples, these samples begin to look more and more like the final 
samples used in this analysis because many teachers included in the “all teachers” samples are 
not full-time teachers in the given subject.   
 
                                                 
35 The results presented in this paper are not sensitive to a reasonable range of adjustments to this threshold.   50 
Because of the imprecision in the assignment of teachers to specific subjects, Tables A.2 through 
A.5 may not reflect an “apples-to-apples” comparison.  The samples used in the analysis are 
much more likely to reflect teachers who specialize in a specific subject.  It seems intuitive that 
students who are taught by less specialized teachers would be subjected to more variation in 
teacher  quality.    This  indicates  another  source  of  downward  bias  in  the  variance  estimates 
presented  in  this  paper.    Unfortunately,  this  understatement  is  unavoidable  given  the 
requirements necessary to control for student fixed effects in the model of student achievement 
and  the  fact  that  teacher  effects  become  less  and  less  precisely  estimated  as  the  number  of 
student observations per teacher falls.  
 
Finally, note that Tables A.2 through A.5 may reflect some overlap.  For example, if a regular 
science teacher taught a handful of math classes for one year due to a math-teacher shortage in 
that year, she would show up in the “all teachers” samples for both math and science teachers (or 
possibly in the “all teachers” sample for math teachers and in the “final sample” for science 
teachers). 
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Appendix B 
Teacher-by-Teacher Herfindahl Indices 
 
 
Herfindahl indices are common in the industrial organization literature where they are used to 
measure  industry  concentration.    For  math  teacher  j  who  has  students  dispersed  into  the 












Here, Srj is the share of math teacher j’s students taught by social studies teacher r and Sj is the 
total number of students taught by math teacher j. 
 
For each teacher-type, I randomly select 50 teachers and calculate each teacher’s Herfindahl 
index into the classrooms of every other teacher type.  Table B.1 presents the averages and 
medians  of  these  teacher-specific  Herfindahl  indices.    The  Department  of  Justice  considers 
industries where the Herfindahl index is between 0.10 and 0.18 to be moderately concentrated 
and industries where it is above 0.18 to be concentrated.  Although the interpretation of the 
Herfindahl indices for teachers may be less clear, they certainly provide useful information about 
the concentration of teachers’ students across subjects.  For example, Table B.1 indicates that the 
average English teacher in my sample could send, at most, 36 percent of her students to any 
particular  math  teacher  if  she  sent  all  of  her  remaining  students  to  different  math  teachers.  
Alternatively, this average English teacher might send 15 percent of her students to six different 
math teachers and the remaining ten percent to a seventh math teacher. 
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The magnitudes of the Herfindahl indices imply that students are well-dispersed among teachers 
across  subjects  at  SDUSD.    There  are  three  factors  in  the  analysis  that  contribute  to  this 
dispersion.  First, the high schools at SDUSD are all relatively large.  Second, there are two 
structural  factors  associated  with  class  scheduling  that  contribute  to  student  dispersion  into 
classrooms across subjects: (1) math in secondary school is not a grade-level specific subject 
whereas social studies, science and English generally are and (2) the typical student at SDUSD 
alternates between taking science and social studies in the 9
th and 10
th grades and, generally 
speaking, only takes these subjects concurrently in the 11
th grade.
36  Third, the teacher effects in 
this analysis are not estimated by-year.  Instead, unlike some other work on teacher quality, I 
combine all of the years of available data into my models and estimate a single teacher effect for 
each teacher in each tested subject.  This means that teacher turnover and changes in the classes  
taught by teachers from year to year affect the sharing patterns of teachers across subjects.  
 
Because the effects of year-to-year teacher turnover on the Herfindahl indices do not speak to 
ability grouping directly, it  is also of interest to evaluate dispersion within years.   Table B.2 
presents average and median Herfindahl indices for a single year, 1999 -2000, for 50 (newly) 
randomly selected teachers in each subject.
37  These indices are analogous to the full -sample 
indices presented in Table B.1.  While the indices in Table B.1 provide information about how 
dispersion affects the mechanical identification of teacher effects, the indices in  Table B.2 
provide more specific information about how much tracking occurs across teachers in different 
subjects at SDUSD. 
 
                                                 
36 See Table 4. 
37 I re-selected the teacher samples for the single-year analysis because not all teachers taught in 1999-2000.   53 
Not  surprisingly,  the  Herfindahl  indices  in  Table  B.2  are  larger  than  those  in  Table  B.1.  
However, Table B.2 still shows that students are widely dispersed to teachers across subjects, 
even within years, corroborating the evidence from the within-teacher variance analysis in Table 




I evaluate the importance of the different components of the student-achievement specification 
by examining the robustness of my results to alternative models.  Table C.1 shows four separate 
value-added specifications.  The fourth column of the table shows the full model estimated in 
equation (1) and columns 1 through 3 show restricted models.  Wald tests for the completeness 
of the restricted models against the full model indicate that the restricted models in columns 1 
and  2  are  underspecified.
38  Across the table, I report the estimated (adjusted) variances of 
teacher quality for each teacher type using each specification.  Also, from each restricted model, 
I estimate the vectors of teacher fixed effects for the relevant teacher types and compare them to 
their analogs from the complete model in column 4 by reporting correlation coefficients.  
 
Table C.1 shows that as the specifications become progressively richer (moving from left to right 
in the table), the estimated variances of teacher quality for the different teacher types generally 
decline.
39  There is a considerable drop in the variance estimates moving from specification (2) 
to specification (3), where the school-level covariates and fixed effects are included.  This drop 
may reflect a reduction in omitted variables bias, but may also reflect the removal of any across-
school variation in teacher quality generated by teacher sorting.  Unfortunately, outside of a 
controlled experiment, there is no clear way to disentangle across -school differences in teacher 
                                                 
38 P-values from Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the omitted variables in the restricted 
models are zero are less than 0.01 for variable groups B and C in each specification.  I do not run tests for the 
statistical significance of the student fixed effects because of the computational demands of such tests.  Furthermore, 
the large-N, small-T structure of my panel dataset implies that the results from these tests would be uninformative 
(lacking power).  However, student fixed effects have a strong theoretical justification for inclusion in the model.  
For further discussion, see Harris and Sass (2006).  Finally, note that all of my major findings are generally robust to 
models of student achievement that are not first-differenced (see Table C.1). The decision about whether to first-
difference the value-added specification seems to be most important in determining teachers’ value-added rankings 
(as indicated by the table) and merits additional attention in future research. 
39 The one exception is for math teachers moving from column 3 to column 4 in both tested subjects.   55 
quality from the other differences across schools that might affect student performance.  By 
focusing within schools and students, the full model in column (4) ensures that teacher effects 
will  not  be  biased  by  school-level  factors  that  influence  student  achievement.    However, 
estimates  from  the  full  model  may  understate  the  total  variance  of  teacher  quality  for  each 
teacher type by omitting any across-school variance. 
 
The correlation coefficients relating the estimated teacher effects across the different models 
provide one gauge of the extent to which omitted variables bias influences teacher-fixed-effect 
estimates.    The  reported  correlations  indicate  that  the  restricted  models  can  significantly 
misrepresent teacher rankings.
40   
 
                                                 
40 Harris and Sass (2006) report a similar result.  However, in addition to changes in the magnitude of the omitted 
variables bias moving across specifications, teacher rankings may also be changing because the richer models 
effectively narrow teachers’ comparison groups.  If teachers are heavily sorted across schools and across students 
(within schools), these comparison-group shifts will have larger effects on teacher rankings.  Of note, the dispersion 
analysis in Section III and Appendix B does not find evidence of strong student-teacher sorting, at least within 
schools.   56 
Appendix D 
Estimating an Upper Bound on the Correlation of 
Teacher Value-Added Across Subjects 
 
I  generate  an  upper  bound  on  the  correlation  of  math-teacher  quality  across  subjects, 
corr m r ( , )   ,  under  the  assumption  that  the  correlation  coefficient  reported  in  Section  VI  is 
understated because corr m r ( , )    0 and this is suppressing the initial estimate of corr m r (  ,  )   .  
Consider the following: 
 
(D.1)    corr m r m m r r m m r r (  ,  ) {cov( , )/{ var( ) * var( )}                   
 
The correlation coefficient of interest in this analysis is corr m r ( , )   .  To obtain an upper-bound 
estimate, I assume that  cov( , )   m r  0,  cov( , )   r m  0, and  cov( , )   m r  0 (these conditions 
also imply that  cov( , )   m m  0 and  cov( , )   r r  0 because I know that  cov( , )   m r  0) and 
expect that none of these covariance terms would be negative.
41  Given these conditions I can 
rewrite equation (D.1) as: 
 
(D.2)    corr m r m r m m r r (  ,  ) {cov( , )/{ var( ) * var( )}             
 
By definition, the correlation coefficient of interest is defined as: 
 
(D.3)    corr m r m r m r ( , ) cov( , )/{ var( ) * var( )}               
 
Combining D.2 and D.3, I can write: 
                                                 
41If these covariances were negative, the procedure outlined in this appendix would not estimate an upper bound and 
the correlation coefficient could potentially be even higher than is reported here.  Because the estimated upper 
bound on the correlation coefficient is greater than 1, these covariances cannot be negative.       57 
 
(D.4)    corr corr m r m r m m m r r r ( , ) (  ,  )*( var( )/ var( ))*( var( )/ var( ))               
 
Which can once again be re-written as: 
 
(D.5)    corr corr m r m r m fe m true r fe r true ( , ) (  ,  )*( / )*( / ) , , , ,         
2 2 2 2  
 
Here,  ,fe
2   represents the total variance of teacher fixed effects and  ,true
2   represents the 
variance of teacher quality by subject as indicated.  I can plug in values for the above variance 
components using estimates from Section  IV.  This generates an upper bound estimate of the 
correlation  of  teacher  effectiveness  across  subjects  of  approximately  1.09.    Because  the 
correlation coefficient is bounded between zero and one, we know that the correlation betw een 
the vectors of estimation errors of the math -teacher coefficients ( m and  r) cannot be zero.  
Nonetheless, the correlation coefficient relating math -teacher quality across subjects can be 
bounded from above at one.   58 
 Appendix E 
Quantitative Properties of the  
Stanford 9 Exams in Secondary School 
 
This  appendix  details  the  quantitative  properties  of  the  math  and  reading  Stanford  9  exams 
administered to secondary school students at SDUSD.  Specifically, it focuses on the extent to 
which these exams are characterized by test-score ceilings.  Test-score ceiling effects can play a 
significant role in the estimation of the variance of outcome-based teacher quality (Koedel and 
Betts, 2007). 
 
A test-score ceiling is characterized by a consistent decline in test-score gains as students make 
progress in the test-score levels distribution.  Importantly, students need not be “at the ceiling” to 
be affected by it.  Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien and Rivkin (2005) and Koedel and Betts (2007) 
discuss the importance of test-score ceiling effects in the estimation of teacher value-added in 
great detail.  The more pronounced the test-score ceiling, the more limited is the exam in terms 
of measuring the value-added of schooling inputs. 
 
It is difficult to test for pure ceiling effects by plotting test-score gains in period (t) versus test-
score levels in period (t-1) because regression to the mean should ensure a negative relationship 
between the two regardless of whether a test-score ceiling exists.  Therefore, I group all students 
into achievement deciles based on their raw test-score level in period (t-2).  I then look to see if 
the average test-score gains for students in period (t) are lower for students in higher deciles.  
Figures E.1 and E.2 detail these results for math and reading, respectively.   
   59 
For math, the distribution of test-score gains across the test-score-levels deciles is quite odd.  On 
the one hand, a strong test-score ceiling is implied for students in the lower achievement deciles.  
However, test-score gains among students in the upper achievement deciles show no indication 
of a ceiling and in fact; their test scores imply an effect that is the opposite of a ceiling effect.  
One explanation for the relationship outlined in Figure E.1 is that the Stanford 9 math exam 
focuses on subject material in a way that causes “average” students to be less likely to experience 
gains because of the classes that they happen to be taking.  The model of student achievement 
used here controls for this by including a vector of subject indicators (i.e., indicators for whether 
a student took algebra, geometry, etc.) for each student in addition to the student fixed effects.   
 
At first glance, the implied effect of the test-score ceiling in math on the estimated variances of 
teacher quality is ambiguous.  If we assume positive student-teacher matching in terms of ability 
(even within-subject) as is the norm, Koedel and Betts (2007) show that the relationship between 
test-score gains and test-score levels documented for students in the bottom deciles implies that 
the omission of student fixed effects will lead to an understatement of the estimated variance of 
teacher quality.  On the other hand, the same relationship in the upper deciles implies that the 
variance of teacher quality will be overstated in the absence of controls for student ability.  A 
comparison of the estimated variances of math-teacher quality in columns 3 and 4 of Table C.1 
indicates that the former effect dominates.  One explanation for this result is that the degree of 
student-teacher  sorting  among  math  teachers  is  higher  for  students  in  lower  achievement 
deciles.
42  This may not be the case for student-teacher sorting in social studies. 
 
                                                 
42 This would be the case if, for example, there is more variation in unobserved student ability among lower-
achieving students or more variation in teacher quality among math teachers who teach lower-achieving students.   60 
For reading, a relatively mild test-score ceiling is present for students in the lower deciles of the 
test-score levels distribution, but this ceiling disappears for students in deciles five through ten.  
The ceiling effect does not have a noticeable impact on the estimated variance of English-teacher 
quality moving from column (3) to column (4) in Table C.1 (such that it breaks away from the 
downward trend).  However, for math teachers, the variance estimate slightly increases once the 
student fixed effects are added to the model.  Again, this may reflect a higher degree of student-
teacher sorting among math teachers for students in lower achievement deciles relative to those 
in higher achievement deciles. 
 
   61 
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